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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	analyzes	the	political	action	repertoire	corporations	use	to	respond	to	and	manage	protest.	It	first	
offers	a	typology	of	the	different	strategic	orientations	corporate	responses	can	take:	avoidance,	acquiescence,	
compromise,	sidestepping,	confrontation,	and	prevention.	Building	on	examples	from	different	case	studies,	it	
illustrates	the	variety	of	tactics	that	can	be	used	within	each	one	of	these	orientations.	Second,	the	chapter	
discusses	some	principles	of	variation	of	corporate	tactics,	focussing	on	institutional	and	cultural	features:	the	
development	of	specialized	firm-internal	units	to	deal	with	protest	management,	and	the	possible	role	of	state	
capacity	and	national	“varieties	of	capitalism”	for	corporate	political	strategies.
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Another	fascinating	and	almost	completely	unstudied	source	of	external	mobilization	and	constraint	is	the
corporation.	In	the	age	of	the	multinational	corporation,	increased	overt	and	covert	intervention	efforts
may	be	expected
(Marx	1979).
Scholars	of	interest	groups,	comparative	political	economy,	and—in	management	studies—of	“corporate	political
activity”	have	provided	insights	into	the	political	power	of	corporations	and	the	various	strategies	they	use	to
shape	legislation	in	their	favor	(Culpepper	2010;	Werner	2012;	Lawton,	McGuire	et	al.	2013;	Walker	and	Rea
2014).	Yet	besides	the	role	of	corporations	in	the	policy-making	process	of	the	state,	another	form	of	politics	exists,
which	has	been	termed	“private	politics”	(Soule	2009;	Baron	2010).	Corporations	and	industries	are	often	the
targets	of	social	movement	activism,	and	increasingly	so	(Walker,	Martin	et	al.	2008;	Soule	2009).	Social	movement
groups	build	coalitions	and	conduct	campaigns	to	challenge	corporations	with	tactical	repertoires	adapted	to	the
marketplace	(Balsiger	2010,	2014a).	Targeted	firms,	in	turn,	have	developed	a	wide	repertoire	of	tactics	to	respond
to	social	movement	demands.	Large	transnational	corporations	have	equipped	themselves	with	specialized	units
dealing	with	risk	management,	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR),	or	public	affairs,	with	the	purpose	of	observing
a	company’s	“contentious”	environment	and	developing	strategies	to	respond	to	demands	from	civil	society.
These	“overt	and	covert	intervention	efforts”—that	is,	corporate	political	actions	and	reactions	to	movement
challenges—are	still	poorly	understood.
Many	studies	have	analyzed	the	outcomes	of	movement–corporate	interactions.	In	private	politics,	markets	and
corporations	themselves	are	“policy-making	venues”	(Baumgartner	and	Jones	1991).	Regulation	scholars	have
studied	forms	of	private	regulation	(Bartley	2007;	Fransen	2012;	Locke	2013),	and	management	scholars	have
been	interested	in	the	rise	of	corporate–NGO	partnerships	(Yaziji	and	Doh	2009)	and	different	forms	of	CSR	(Vogel
2005;	Crouch	2006;	Egels-Zandén	and	Wahlqvist	2007;	de	Bakker	and	den	Hond	2008;	Gond,	Kang	et	al.	2011).
But	often,	firms	use	CSR	policies	and	forms	of	self-regulation	strategically,	as	a	way	to	respond	to	challenges,
deflect	attention	or	prevent	more	encompassing	and	binding	regulations	and	policy	changes	(Fooks,	Gilmore	et	al.
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2013;	Scherer,	Palazzo	et	al.	2014).	And	firms’	repertoires	to	respond	to	and	“manage”	protest	do	not	stop	there:
other,	more	explicitly	political	and	sometimes	contentious	strategies	exist.	Examples	include	communication
strategies	of	“reputation	management”	(McDonnell	and	King	2013),	or	counter-campaigns	to	defy	and	decry
particular	opponents.
The	first	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	map	and	classify	this	repertoire	of	corporate	protest	management.	Second,	the
chapter	discusses	some	principles	of	variation	of	corporate	tactics	and	develops	hypotheses	that	could	be
empirically	tested	and	that	have	not	yet	been	fully	addressed.	Beyond	variations	of	corporate	and	industry
opportunity	structures,	which	have	been	covered	prominently	in	the	existing	literature	(Schurman	2004;	King	and
Soule	2007;	King	2008,	Werner	2012;	Waldron,	Navis	et	al.	2013;	see	Soule	and	King,	this	volume),	the	chapter
focusses	on	institutional	and	cultural	features	that	are	likely	to	affect	corporate	political	actions:	the	development
of	specialized	firm-internal	units	to	deal	with	protest	management,	and	the	possible	role	of	state	capacity	and
national	“varieties	of	capitalism”	for	corporate	political	strategies.
State	Politics	and	Private	Politics
In	state	politics,	firms	use	their	resources	to	influence	governments,	legislations,	administrations,	and	public	opinion
through	their	institutional	integration	into	policy	making	as	well	as	through	lobbying	efforts	and	opinion	campaigns,
either	as	part	of	business	associations	or	as	individual	corporations	(Hall	and	Soskice	2001;	Maloney,	Jordan	et	al.
2007;	Wilks	2013).	Many	times,	firms	use	their	resources	to	keep	certain	issues	from	the	public	agenda,	through
public	persuasion	efforts	to	“suppress	public	discussion	of	the	grand	issues	of	politico-economic	organization”
(Werner	2012).	Business	power	is	often	the	greatest	when	politics	is	“quiet”	(Culpepper	2010).	Sometimes,
however,	regulative	threat	or	outside	challengers	force	firms	to	take	public	stances	and	defend	their	interests
publicly.
Next	to	traditional	forms	of	state	politics,	scholars	have	pointed	at	the	rising	prominence	of	“private	politics,”	where
corporations	directly	oppose	civil	society	challengers.	Baron	(2010)	defines	private	politics	as	“politics	(which)
pertains	to	individual	and	collective	action	to	influence	the	conduct	of	private	agents,	including	oneself,	as	in	the
case	of	NGOs	that	apply	social	pressure	to	change	the	conduct	of	firms”	(Baron	2010:	1299).	In	private	politics,
the	state	plays	only	a	minimal	role,	if	any.	NGOs	target	corporations	directly;	forms	of	private	voluntary	regulation
(Locke	2013)	can	emerge	without	the	contribution	of	any	national	or	transnational	governmental	institutions,	solely
between	NGOs	and	firms	or	driven	by	businesses	alone.
Management	scholars	have	repeatedly	pointed	out	that	firms	have	started	to	engage	in	activities	that	have
traditionally	been	regarded	as	core	government	activities:	public	health,	education,	social	security,	or	the
protection	of	human	rights	(Scherer	and	Palazzo	2011).	This	“new	political	role”	of	corporations	(Scherer	and
Palazzo	2011)	is	interpreted	as	the	result	of	regulatory	gaps	that	emerge	due	to	increased	globalization	of	markets
and	the	limited	reach	of	states	and	international	regulation.	Matten	and	Crane	(2005)	speak	of	the	need	to	“reframe
corporate	citizenship	away	from	the	notion	that	the	corporation	is	a	citizen	in	itself	(as	individuals	are)	and	toward
the	acknowledgement	that	the	corporation	administers	certain	aspects	of	citizenship	for	other	constituencies”
(Matten	and	Crane	2005:	173).	In	sum,	firms	do	not	just	do	political	activities	(as	when	trying	to	influence	legislation
in	their	favor),	they	are	political	(Scherer,	Palazzo	et	al.	2014).	But	what	business	scholars	often	fail	to
acknowledge	is	that	this	increasingly	political	role	of	corporations	is	not	just	a	response	to	regulatory	gaps,	but	is
inserted	into	contentious	dynamics	of	the	“private	politics”	kind	that	oppose	civil	society	actors	and	firms.	National
and	transnational	markets	have	increasingly	become	arenas	of	contentious	interactions.	Regulatory	gaps	are	often
only	addressed	once	social	movement	actors	formulate	grievances	and	publicly	oppose	corporate	policies.
Private	politics	seems	to	have	become	more	important	in	recent	decades,	but	it	is	not	historically	new.	In	the	history
of	the	modern	welfare	state,	for	instance,	direct	negotiations	between	firms	and	labor	unions	have	a	long	tradition,
and	in	some	cases,	certain	welfare	and	health	programs	are	still	employer-run.	Governance	scholars	have
suggested	that	such	modes	of	self-governance—which	occur	also	in	other	fields	such	as	environmental	protection
or	quality	control—emerge	in	the	“shadow	of	hierarchy.”	When	facing	threats	for	binding	and	encompassing
legislation,	companies	and	business	associations	prefer	to	self-regulate	rather	than	submit	to	public	regulation
(Héritier	and	Lehmkuhl	2008;	Werner	2012).	There	is	thus	a	close	relationship	between	private	and	state	politics:
private	politics	can	be	used	by	firms	to	prevent	state	regulation.	But	private	politics	is	also	an	arena	strategically
2
chosen	by	activist	when	there	is	no	progress	in	state	politics	(Balsiger	2014b),	and	it	becomes	more	important
because	state	politics	lacks	legislative	authority	on	many	prominent	contemporary	issues	in	a	globalized	world.
Finally,	firms	can	also	use	their	access	to	state	politics	to	fight	back	against	their	direct	challengers.	In	sum,	the
political	repertoire	of	corporations	in	private	politics	needs	to	be	seen	in	close	association	with	state	politics,	as
firms’	strategic	repertoires	in	private	and	state	politics	can	overlap	and	may	be	intimately	linked.
Mapping	Corporate	Strategies	and	Tactics	to	Manage	Protest
What	is	the	action	repertoire	of	firms	in	private	politics?	Building	on	and	complementing	existing	typologies	of
corporate	political	action	(Oliver	1991;	Kneip	2012,	2013;	Walker	and	Rea	2014),	we	can	distinguish	between	six
strategic	orientations	of	corporate	action	to	respond	to	and	manage	protest:	avoidance,	acquiescence,
compromise,	sidestepping,	confrontation,	and	prevention	(see	Table	1).
Table	1	Strategic	orientations	of	corporate	reactions	to	activist	challenges
Strategic	orientation Possible	tactics
Avoidance Non-reaction
Denying	responsibility
Acquiescence Collaboration	with	activist	organization
Compromise Self-regulation
Negotiations
Compensations
Labels
Sidestepping Reputation/Impression	management
Collaboration	with	competing	activist	organization
Labels
Confrontation Public	relations	campaign
Grass-roots	lobbying
Coalition	formation
Collaboration	with	competing	activist	organization
Legal	action
Prevention Media	monitoring
Research
Infiltration
The	strategies	go	from	no	resistance	to	new	demands	to	an	increasingly	active	role	by	firms	in	opposing	demands
and	shaping	the	terms	of	the	public	debate	themselves.	Each	of	these	strategies	can	be	pursued	through	different
tactics,	and	firms	can	either	act	as	single	firms,	or	they	can	cooperate	with	other	firms	in	business	associations
(Walker	and	Rea	2014).	In	general,	the	firms	in	question	are	large,	most	of	the	time	transnationally	active
multinational	corporations:	those	are	the	ones	that	are	most	often	targeted	by	social	movement	actors	and	have
the	resources	to	actively	respond	to	movement	challengers.
Before	illustrating	the	tactics	used	within	the	different	strategic	orientations,	two	general	features	of	tactical
responses	should	be	kept	in	mind.	First,	as	many	authors	have	pointed	out	(Vogel	2005;	Kneip	2012),	tactics	can
be	either	substantive	or	symbolic,	that	is,	they	may	consist	of	concrete	actions	or	merely	of	communication.	The
two	often	go	together,	but	not	necessarily.	Firms	publish	press	releases	to	communicate	on	a	charity	program	they
are	launching,	and	at	the	same	time	initiate	steps	to	launch	the	program.	But	firms	may	also	just	pay	lip	service	to
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certain	demands	without	following	up	with	concrete	actions.	In	this	case,	they	make	discursive	concessions	without
substantive	ones.	Second,	some	tactics	can	be	used	to	pursue	several	strategic	orientations,	while	others	are
more	closely	associated	with	one	particular	strategy.	For	example,	suing	protesters	for	libel	belongs	to	the	strategic
orientation	of	confrontation.	But	a	tactic	such	as	putting	in	place	a	specific	corporate	policy	can	be	both	a	case	of
sidestepping,	of	compromise,	or	even	acquiescence,	depending	on	the	exact	nature	of	the	policy	and	of	the
demands.	Only	a	contextual	analysis	can	tell	us	which	case	applies.
The	different	tactics	used	within	these	strategic	orientations	are	illustrated	by	drawing	on	examples	from	the
literature	of	contentious	markets.	The	examples	thereby	focus	on	corporate	strategies	to	respond	to	outside
challengers.	Important	challenges	can	also	be	voiced	from	within	firms,	by	unions	and	employee	groups	in
particular.	Although	the	range	of	strategic	orientations	of	responses	may	be	similar	in	these	cases	of	inside
challenges,	the	actual	tactics	are	likely	to	differ	substantively	and	are	left	aside	in	this	contribution.
Avoidance
Avoidance	is	a	form	of	reaction	that	is	actually	a	non-reaction,	but	a	deliberate	one:	Firms	simply	ignore	demands.
It	is	thus	not	the	same	as	when	firms	are	not	even	aware	of	a	particular	demand:	avoidance	means	that	firms
choose	not	to	react	to	a	demand.	They	just	wait	it	out,	hoping	that	“the	storm	will	pass.”	In	the	anti-sweatshop
struggle,	for	instance,	many	of	the	targeted	retailers	did	not	respond	to	campaign	demands	and	did	not	take	any
measures	regarding	social	standards	in	supply	chains	(Balsiger	2014b).	When	they	did	react,	they	often	first
denied	their	responsibility—a	more	active	form	of	avoidance—pointing	at	subcontractors	instead.	Actually,
avoidance	is	often	a	paying	strategy.	Activist	groups	usually	focus	on	big	firms	and	firms	that	show	some
willingness	to	respond	to	demands.	Once	a	firm	makes	some	commitments,	activists	can	hold	managers
accountable	to	their	own	declarations.	Ensuring	a	good	reputation	has	thus	mixed	impact	for	corporations—it	also
attracts	further	protest	(Vogel	2005).
Acquiescence
Acquiescence	means	that	companies	accept	activist	demands	and	change	their	policies	accordingly.	For	example,
one	of	the	chief	strategies	of	the	European	anti-GMO	movement	was	to	target	supermarket	chains	demanding	them
to	go	GMO	free.	The	first	store	which	agreed	to	do	this	was	a	small	frozen	food	company	called	Iceland	Foods;	but
over	the	next	few	years,	many	other	European	retailers	followed	this	lead	(Schurman	and	Munro	2010).	The
determinants	of	compliance	are	the	object	of	many	studies	(see	Soule	and	King,	this	volume)	and	have	to	do	with
management	capacities	and	commitment	(Zald,	Morrill	et	al.	2005).	At	least	two	different	mechanisms	are	at	play:
public	pressure	and	reputational	damage	may	provoke	companies	to	accept	demands—but	more	often,	this
probably	leads	to	some	kind	of	compromise.	Secondly,	acquiescence	can	also	be	a	paying	“social	strategy”	for
firms,	who	can	thereby	distinguish	themselves	from	their	competitors.	Activist	campaigns	can	provide	firms	with
what	Husted	and	Allen	(2011:	92)	call	“social	issue	opportunities”	and	thus	create	a	potential	competitive
advantage	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	such	behavior	is	purely	opportunistic	and	driven	solely	by
economic	interests.	It	can	also	resonate	with	managers’	or	owners’	ideology	and	political	convictions.	In	this	case,
firms	can	become	allies	to	activist	struggles:	they	are	a	source	of	external	mobilization	rather	than	a	source	of
constraint.
Compromise
Compromise	involves	some	kind	of	implicit	or	explicit	negotiation	of	demands.	Another	term	would	be	concessions.
When	compromising,	firms	may	focus	on	one	site	or	object	of	the	contention	but	disregard	others.	In	their	reaction
against	NGO	campaigns	for	socially	accountable	finance,	big	banks	cooperated	to	create	the	Equator	Principles,	a
set	of	environmental	and	social	risk	management	guidelines	for	project	finance	(O’Sullivan	and	O’Dwyer	2014).	The
principles	took	up	a	number	of	social	movement	demands,	but	left	out	others:	in	particular,	it	focussed	only	on
project	finance	instead	of	all	financial	operations	and	lacked	accountability	mechanisms	that	were	demanded	by
activists.	In	this	case,	banks	thus	put	in	place	forms	of	self-regulation	that	took	up	movement	demands,	but	kept	the
regulation	firmly	under	their	own	control.	Similar	to	self-regulation	“in	the	shadow	of	hierarchy”	(Héritier	and
Lehmkuhl	2008),	firms	and	industries	develop	their	own	modes	of	regulation	in	the	“shadow	of	public
4
campaigning.”
Another	example	of	compromise	and	concession	is	when	companies	enter	into	negotiations	and	offer
compensations	for	the	consequences	of	their	practices.	In	mining	conflicts	with	local	communities,	for	instance,
transnational	mining	companies	build	hospitals	or	schools	and	pay	for	healthcare	and	education	for	local
populations.	They	collaborate	and	fund	moderate	groups	to	push	for	such	agreements	and	thus	hope	to
marginalize	more	radicalized	groups	(Gustaffson	2014).
Sidestepping
Depending	on	the	point	of	view,	the	last	example	contains	actions	that	also	qualify	as	a	form	of	confronting
opponents	or	as	sidestepping	tactics	by	giving	concessions	on	aspects	that	are	unrelated	to	core	movement
demands.	Sidestepping	means	that	companies	use	tactics	to	respond	to	movement	demands	that	do	not	address
the	actual	demands,	but	concern	other	issues.	Reputation	or	impression	management	tactics	(McDonnell	and	King
2013)	most	of	the	time	belong	in	this	category.	As	a	reaction	to	activist	challenges,	firms	put	forward	particular
social	or	environmental	commitments	that	are	however	unrelated	to	the	concrete	demands	and	are	commonly
denounced	as	greenwashing	or	window-dressing	by	critical	observers.	They	can	be	mere	communication
strategies	or	actually	consist	of	undertakings	like	reporting,	auditing,	or	donations.	Often,	firms	make	donations	to
nonprofits:	for	instance,	Wal	Mart	increased	donations	to	conservation	programs	in	response	to	criticism	by
environmental	groups	(Vogel	2005).	The	nonprofits	that	benefit	from	such	generosity	are	usually	moderate,
noncritical	NGOs	with	whom	firms	like	to	associate	(Vogel	2005).	Firms	also	sometimes	cherry	pick	benevolent
SMOs	to	start	partnerships	with	them.
Sidestepping	strategies	also	concern	the	market	arena.	A	widespread	market	tactic	is	the	development	of	product
labels	that	take	up	specific	social	movement	issues—green,	organic,	fair	trade,	pesticide-free,	etc.	Sometimes,
social	movement	organizations	are	behind	such	labels	and	they	are	thus	not	necessarily	sidestepping	tactics.	But
in	certain	contexts,	even	such	movement-approved	labels	can	be	used	as	sidestepping	tactics.
Confrontation
Confrontation	strategies	are	designed	to	actively	counter	activist	groups	and	their	demands.	Firms	can	for	instance
counter-frame	the	issue	at	stake	through	public	campaigns.	In	the	case	of	the	French	anti-sweatshop	campaign,
retailers	cooperated	with	each	other	and	created	their	own	monitoring	initiative.	But	they	went	further	than	that:
they	publicly	attacked	their	opponents	through	a	carefully	orchestrated	media	campaign,	featuring	an	open	letter
that	questioned	the	legitimacy	of	the	campaigners	(Balsiger	2014b).	Counter-framing	can	consist	in	delegitimizing
opponents,	but	it	can	also	mean	that	a	company	reframes	its	own	practices	and	policies	in	a	way	that	appeals	to	a
broader	coalition.	For	instance,	when	the	Canadian	log	industry	was	attacked	by	Greenpeace	for	the
environmental	damage	it	caused,	industry	officials	argued	that	bans	and	increased	regulation	would	lead	to	job
losses.	They	managed	to	gain	workers	and	their	unions	as	allies	in	opposing	environmentalists	(Zietsma	and	Winn
2008).	Informing	and	mobilizing	different	social	groups	on	their	behalf	is	a	common	strategy	that	corporations	and
industries	use.	For	the	US	case	in	particular,	E.	Walker	(2009,	2014)	has	shown	how	companies	use	agencies
specialized	in	grass-roots	mobilization	not	just	to	seek	out	allies	among	civil	society,	but	to	actively	mobilize	them,
by	funding	groups,	developing	tools	of	mobilization	like	flyers,	leaflets,	etc.	“Grass-roots	mobilization”	by
corporations	thus	goes	even	further:	it	means	actively	creating	support	and	mobilizing	it,	while	hiding	behind
specialized	agencies.	Of	course,	this	kind	of	tactic	can	be	used	not	just	against	threats	by	social	movements,	but
also	proactively	to	shape	public	policy	making.
The	tactics	firms	use	to	counter	their	social	movement	opponents	also	play	out	in	other	arenas.	In	issues	where
science	plays	a	prominent	role,	industries	challenge	scientific	findings	and	propose	their	own	studies.	The	biotech
industry	funded	and	conducted	studies	on	the	benefits	and	on	the	lack	of	risks	of	biotechnology	(Schurman	and
Munro	2010).	Often,	it	is	sufficient	for	industries	to	create	doubt	about	the	consequences	of	practices	like	smoking
or	pesticide	use	to	prevent	regulation	(Michaels	2008)	and	counter	activist	demands.
Firms	also	go	to	court	to	fight	their	challengers	and	try	to	silence	them.	Reacting	against	“culture	jammers,”	that	is,
activists	subverting	brand	logos	and	advertisement,	firms	like	Nike	or	Coca-Cola	have	taken	activists	to	court	for
tampering	with	their	brand	imagery	(Micheletti	and	Stolle	2013:	177).	Often,	the	mere	threat	of	legal	action	is
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enough	to	cause	activists	to	back	away.	Sometimes	corporations	also	pressure	legislators	or	governments	into
taking	action	against	activists	and	their	tactics.	In	many	US	states,	for	instance,	legislators	voted	for	bills
criminalizing	the	secret	filming	of	animal	abuse	in	agricultural	facilities	under	pressure	from	the	agricultural
industry.	Finally,	firms	can	also	use	direct	forms	of	repression.	They	can	call	upon	the	police	when	it	comes	to
protecting	private	property	from	attacks.	In	other	cases,	they	may	have	their	own	private	security	forces	to	move
protestors	away,	repress	or	arrest	them,	such	as	in	private	settings	like	malls	or	in	contexts	with	relatively	weak
states.	As	these	examples	show,	state	and	private	politics	are	not	always	clearly	separated.
Prevention
Firms	do	not	only	react	to	movement	demands,	they	also	try	to	prevent	them	from	arising	in	the	first	place	and	put
in	place	measures	to	be	better	prepared	when	they	do	arise.	A	lot	of	this	is	information	gathering	on	the	social
movement	sector.	A	fine	knowledge	of	social	movement	actors	is	very	useful	when	it	comes	to	finding	allies	or
negotiating	and	striking	deals	with	big	NGOs.	Public	affairs	or	risk	management	units	within	big	firms	employ
specialists	who	deal	with	this,	or	mandate	agencies	specialized	in	public	relations	or	public	affairs.	Large	firms	also
monitor	the	media	and,	increasingly,	social	media	to	follow	the	public	debate	mentioning	them	in	order	to	be	ready
to	intervene	quickly	if	an	issue	arises.	In	parallel,	they	try	to	shape	this	public	debate	by	intervening	in	social	media
and	by	providing	content	to	traditional	media	organizations.	This	form	of	surveillance	can	go	much	further,	as
illustrated	by	a	case	that	was	uncovered	a	few	years	ago	in	Switzerland:	Nestlé	had	managed	to	infiltrate	a	local
group	that	was	researching	a	book	on	the	company,	by	placing	a	person	working	for	a	private	security	company	in
the	group.
Some	Principles	of	Variation
Scholars	have	used	the	concepts	of	corporate	and	industry	opportunity	structure	to	analyze	how	corporations	and
markets	influence	social	movement	dynamics	and	outcomes.	Many	studies	convincingly	show	that	corporate	and
industry	characteristics	shape	the	strategic	responses	by	firms	to	movement	challengers.	Beyond	such	factors
reviewed	by	Soule	and	King	(this	volume),	this	discussion	focusses	on	two,	so	far	mostly	overlooked,	aspects	that
are	likely	to	shape	corporate	strategic	responses:	the	political–institutional	context	within	which	movement–
corporate	interactions	take	place,	and	the	rise	of	specialized	“public	affairs”	units	within	firms.
Political–Institutional	Contexts
The	“varieties	of	capitalism”	literature	reveals	the	organization	of	capitalism	into	a	number	of	national	institutional
configurations.	It	distinguishes	between	coordinated,	state-led,	and	liberal	market	economies	(Hall	and	Soskice
2001).	Within	such	different	contextual	settings,	firms	are	organized	differently	and	differ	in	their	relationship	to	the
state.	It	is	possible	that	such	differences	are	also	reflected	in	the	reactions	of	firms	to	activist	campaigns.	For
instance,	in	Germany,	workers	are	represented	on	company	boards,	giving	unions	an	institutionalized	role	in
corporate	decision	making	that	is	not	found	in	many	other	countries.	This	rule	of	corporate	governance,	together
with	other	corporate	arrangements,	means	that	companies	are	used	to	cooperating	and	negotiating	with	unions,
which	could	predispose	them	also	to	reach	compromises	with	activist	challengers	(Kang	and	Moon	2012).	In	a
country	like	France,	in	contrast,	state	regulation	is	the	norm	and	not	bipartite	arrangements	at	the	firm	or	industry
level;	corporate	governance	does	not	include	employee	representation.	Here,	firms	could	be	less	inclined	to
cooperation	and	instead	more	likely	to	ignore	demands,	reject	voluntary	regulation,	and	expect	the	state	to
intervene.
Walker	(forthcoming)	claims	that	the	use	of	grass-roots	lobbying	differs	greatly	depending	on	the	national
organization	of	capitalism.	Similarly,	Gond,	Kang,	and	Moon	(2011)	discuss	the	national	shaping	of	CSR	policies.	But
this	last	study	also	points	out	a	trend	that	cuts	across	national	traditions:	the	move	towards	deregulation	and	open
markets	has	made	CSR	an	instrument	of	public	policy	in	many	European	countries.	This	indicates	a	countervailing
force	that	might	suppress	distinct	national	characteristics.	In	addition,	many	of	the	firms	that	are	targeted	by
activists	are	multinational	companies	that	operate	globally	and	perhaps	no	longer	belong	to	any	distinct	national
tradition.	One	can	thus	have	different	expectations	around	the	role	of	political	contexts	for	corporate	strategies.	On
the	one	hand,	following	the	varieties	of	capitalism	approach,	one	could	expect	strong	national	differences
clustering	into	national	corporate	repertoires.	But	another	hypothesis,	taking	up	theories	of	capitalist	globalization,
6
would	make	us	think	that	those	differences	are	declining	because	both	firms	and	their	challengers	operate
transnationally.	At	least	for	big	multinational	companies,	we	might	also	witness	the	rise	of	a	transnational	repertoire
of	protest	management.
If	we	move	beyond	the	Western	world,	state	capacity	is	an	additional	political–institutional	dimension	that	is	likely	to
affect	corporate	strategies.	When	states	have	less	resources	and	coercive	capacities	or	even	lack	control	of	parts
of	their	national	territory,	firms	have	much	greater	leverage	in	developing	strategies.	Scholars	of	corporate
citizenship	often	use	examples	from	such	contexts	to	show	how	corporations	come	to	assume	tasks	that	in	other
circumstances	constitute	the	prerogative	of	the	state,	such	as	education	or	even	policing.	The	complex
relationship	between	weak	local	states	depending	on	foreign	investment,	multinational	companies	pursuing	profit-
seeking	activities,	and	local	and	transnational	activists,	has	not	been	sufficiently	addressed.	On	the	other	hand,	in
authoritarian	states,	the	corporate	repertoire	to	manage	protest	may	also	be	different	from	democratic	contexts.
More	generally,	this	points	at	the	question	of	the	relative	autonomy	between	the	corporate	sector	and
governments.
Public	Affairs	Departments	and	Protest	Management	Styles
Examining	the	characteristics	of	those	who	are	in	charge	of	the	management	of	protest	within	firms	is	a	further
promising	aspect	for	study.	The	range	of	repertoires	used	is	also	likely	to	depend	on	the	amount	of	expertise	and
specialization	one	finds	within	companies.	Large	transnational	firms,	in	particular,	consist	of	different	units	and
factions	and	often	have	complex	governance	structures.	The	rise	of	specialized	units	within	firms	to	deal	with
public	affairs	or	CSR	has	been	a	trend	in	recent	years,	and	is	an	unintended	effect	of	increasing	activist	campaigns
(McDonnell,	King,	and	Soule	2014).	Such	units	lead	firms	to	develop	more	conscious	strategic	responses	and	may
also	bring	about	routinized	relationships	between	corporate	officials	and	activist	organizations.	Here,	an	analogy
with	the	study	of	protest	policing	proves	useful:	the	police	force	is	an	important	actor	in	dealing	with	street	protest
and	its	organizational	culture	and	institutional	environment	shape	different	policing	styles	(Della	Porta	and	Fillieule
2004).	Public	relations	and	public	affairs	personnel	similarly	constitute	a	professional	group	specialized	in
managing	protest	within	big	firms,	albeit	very	different	from	police	forces.
Drawing	on	findings	from	policing	studies,	one	could	assume	that	personal	knowledge	between	firm	officials	and
activists	is	important	not	only	from	the	perspective	of	social	movements	(as	“internal	allies”	(Raeburn	2004)),	but
also	from	the	perspective	of	firms,	for	whom	such	relationships	can	provide	valuable	information	and,	therefore,
predictability.	Policing	studies	have	also	revealed	the	selectiveness	of	policing	strategies,	depending	on	police
perception	of	opponent	groups.	A	similar	sociology	of	public	affairs	personnel	could	inquire	whether	such	routines
also	exist	within	corporations,	and	how	perception	of	different	groups	and	causes	affects	the	strategies	companies
use	to	respond	to	challenges.	Management	literature	routinely	distinguishes	between	moderate	and	radical	groups,
for	example	(den	Hond	and	de	Bakker	2007;	Yaziji	and	Doh	2009).	This	kind	of	categorization,	built	on	previous
experiences,	activist	tactics,	and	diffuse	perception	categories,	might	lead	to	selective	corporate	reactions
depending	on	groups.	Similarly,	different	causes	may	be	treated	differently	by	public	affairs	managers;	causes	that
are	seen	as	radical	or	marginal,	for	instance	animal	rights	or	executive	compensation,	could	be	treated	with	less
benevolence	than	more	mainstream	causes	such	as	environmental	issues.
Conclusion
Although	“the	politics	of	business	are	nuanced,	multifaceted,	and	focused	on	winning	hearts	and	minds	as	much	as
on	votes	and	pocketbooks”	(Walker	and	Rea	2014),	there	are	still	very	few	studies,	especially	with	a	political
sociological	perspective,	that	consider	how	corporations	act	politically	by	trying	to	shape	public	opinion,	foster
their	legitimacy,	and	respond	to	challenges	from	activists.	In	parallel	with	increased	movement	pressures,
corporations	have	developed	their	arsenal	of	tactics	and	the	sophistication	of	their	counter-strategies.	This	chapter
has	offered	a	typology	of	those	strategies	and	discussed	some	as	yet	rarely	addressed	aspects	of	contextual	and
firm-internal	institutional	variation	that	are	likely	to	shape	corporate	reactions	to	challenges.	The	existing	literature
indicates	that	corporations	are	very	active	“sources	of	constraint”	for	social	movement	mobilization.	Within	the
different	types	of	strategic	orientations,	the	more	contentious	tactics	of	sidestepping,	confronting,	and	preventing
particularly	reveal	corporations’	ability	to	shape	movement	demands	according	to	their	interests	and	indicate	the
political	nature	of	corporate	actions.	But	at	the	same	time,	scholars	must	also	acknowledge	that	corporations	can
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be	“sources	of	external	mobilization,”	too:	social	entrepreneurs,	green	start-ups,	or	LGBT-friendly	companies	can
be	allies	of	movements	and	advocate	stricter	regulations	or	the	acceptance	of	rights	along	with	movements.
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